31.10.2024

Statute of limitations from the ECHR perspective - Sanofi Pasteur v. France

In its case law, the European Court of Human Rights ("the Court" or "the ECtHR") has emphasized on numerous occasions that the principle of security of legal relations, which, in particular, guarantees a certain stability of legal situations and contributes to public confidence in the courts, constitutes one of the foundations of the rule of law.

Prescriptibility, i.e. the extinction of the substantive right of action, can be seen as a component of the principle of security of legal relations which, in essence, limits the possibility of bringing legal proceedings after a certain period of time has elapsed. In the Court's case-law, this principle is analyzed in the context of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights[1], on which occasion it has been held that limitation periods must be reasonable and must not create an imbalance between the rights of the claimants and the need to ensure legal certainty for the defendant parties.

A relevant example of ECHR case law on the matter is the case of Sanofi Pasteur v. France (Application No. 25137/16, judgment of February 13, 2020), in which the Court considered how limitation periods for bringing an action for damages (in particular how they start to run) may affect access to justice and the balance between the rights of the parties.

Specifically, the Court examined the question of the commencement of the limitation period in relation to Article 6(1) of the Convention, thus contrasting two rights protected by the Convention: on the one hand, Sanofi Pasteur's right to legal certainty and, on the other, X's right to apply to the courts.

In fact, as a trainee nurse, X, who was born in 1972, was subject to compulsory vaccination against hepatitis B. Between 1992 and 1994, she received several injections of a vaccine manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur. Nurse X was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1993, Crohn's disease in 1999, and polymyositis in 2004.

In 2002, X brought an action for damages against the State before the administrative courts under Article L. 3111-9 of the Public Health Code, which provided at the time of the dispute that "Without prejudice to possible actions under ordinary law, compensation for damage directly attributable to a compulsory vaccination administered under the conditions mentioned in this chapter is due by the State. The State shall be subrogated, for an amount not exceeding the sums paid, to the rights of the victim against the person liable for the damage.". The action was upheld and the State was thus obliged to pay him € 656,803.83 by way of compensation for his personal injuries and also to pay him an annual pension of € 10,950.

In 2005, X brought a new civil action, this time against Sanofi Pasteur, claiming damages for aggravation of the personal injuries for which he had been awarded damages in the first action. The basis of the action was the manufacturer's liability for damages caused by defects in its product.

The action was declared admissible by the Regional Court of Toulouse and then by the Court of Appeal of Toulouse, and as regards the limitation period for the claimant's substantive right of action, a defence raised by Sanofi Pasteur, the courts held that in the case of an action for damages for personal injury, the limitation period cannot begin to run until the medical condition is stabilized, that is to say, when it loses its progressive nature, since only then can the claimant assess the extent of the entire damage.

On the merits, the courts held that Sanofi Pasteur was liable for the damage suffered by X. Noting that the administrative court had ordered the State to pay compensation for the personal injury, the civil court ordered an expert's report to be carried out in order to verify in particular whether the victim's current condition indicated an aggravation of the injury already covered by the compensation to which the State had previously been liable. On November 17, 2015, in accordance with the findings of the expert report, the Regional Court of Toulouse ordered Sanofi Pasteur to pay X the following sums: €8,050 by way of permanent impairment, €8,050 by way of permanent functional impairment, €1,500 by way of suffering endured and disfigurement, an annual pension of €5,475 for the assistance of a third person and €2,000 by way of legal costs.

In its complaint to the ECHR, Sanofi Pasteur argued that the way in which the commencement of the limitation period for X's action was fixed as the date on which the damage was finally sustained had the consequence that that action was de facto no longer subject to a limitation period and therefore not subject to a statute of limitations, given that the disease which caused the damage was not susceptible to stabilization, the medical condition being of a constantly progressive nature. Sanofi Pasteur took the view that the principle of legal certainty guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and its right to property guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had thus been infringed.

In the recitals to its decision, the ECHR reiterated that statutory limitation periods, which constitute one of the legitimate limits of the right of access to justice, serve several important purposes, namely ensuring legal certainty, to protect potential defendants against stale claims which might be difficult to counter and to prevent any injustice which might arise if the courts were obliged to rule on events which took place in the distant past on the basis of evidence which might have become uncertain and incomplete with the passage of time (see, for example, Stubbings and Others v. United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, §§ 51-52, Repots of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; Stagno v. Belgium, no. 1062/07, § 26, 7 July 2009; and Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, nos. 52067/10 and 41072/11, §§ 71-72, 11 March 2014).

On the basis of this conclusion, in Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (application no. 21722/11, §§ 138-140), the Court examined the situation of a judge who had been dismissed for breach of oath and who based his application on the absence of limitation periods provided for by domestic law in this type of proceedings. The Court observed that the applicant was in the difficult position of having to support his defense by reference to events which, in part, had occurred in the distant past. Stressing that such an overt approach to disciplinary cases involving members of the judiciary constituted a serious threat to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 as a result of the infringement of the principle of legal certainty caused by the absence of a limitation period.

The Court also held that, in cases concerning compensation to victims of personal injury, the persons concerned should have the right to take legal proceedings when they are actually capable of assessing the damage suffered and that subjecting them to a limitation period expiring before the date on which the damage was assessed could infringe the right of access to justice.

By reference to the facts of the case, the Court held that, by fixing the starting point of the limitation period for the right to claim compensation at the date on which the illness stabilized, the French law sought to enable the victim to obtain full compensation for the damage, which could be awarded only after his condition had stabilized. It follows that the choice made in the French legal system was to give priority to the right of persons who have suffered physical injury to have access to a court over the right to legal certainty of the persons responsible for that injury.

In the present case, the Court stated that the right of access to justice is affected when an action seeking compensation for damage suffered, in the case of personal injury, becomes time-barred before the person concerned is able to assess his or her actual and full injury. This is the situation in which X found herself: in view of the progressive nature of her illness and in the absence of stabilization, she was unable to assess her damage in full and was therefore unable to sue the company which manufactured the vaccine at a date prior to that stabilization in order to obtain full compensation. In such cases the balancing of individual interests, which may be conflicting, becomes a particularly difficult issue, but Contracting States must have a wide margin of discretion in this regard.

The Court reiterated the importance attached by the Convention to the protection of physical integrity and found that this method of calculation allowed account to be taken of the fact that the needs of persons suffering from a progressive disease such as multiple sclerosis might increase with the progression of their condition, for example in terms of the assistance required. In the light of these considerations, the Court concluded that there had been no infringement of Article 6 § 1 by reason of the way in which the starting point of the limitation period for bringing an action for damages against the person who caused the damage was determined.

The Court's reasoning reaffirms the importance of the principle of legal certainty by establishing limitation periods, but also emphasizes that, in cases of progressive diseases, the progressive nature of the disease must be taken into account and that limitation periods must be applied fairly, without placing claimants at an unreasonable disadvantage, especially where there are difficulties in establishing precisely when the disease stabilizes.

While the Court supports the need for clear starting points for limitation periods, it recognizes that in cases of degenerative diseases such as multiple sclerosis, the actual time of stabilization of the medical condition may be difficult to identify. Thus, limitation periods must not be applied in a rigid manner which could deny access to justice, but must be compatible with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In that connection, the Court emphasized that the prescription regime should not make it impossible or excessively difficult for applicants to exercise their right to obtain compensation, particularly in cases of progressive diseases where symptoms and deterioration may appear gradually.

The Court also pointed out that, in the case of progressive illnesses, limitation periods should reflect the fact that deterioration of the state of health may occur in stages. Thus, the plaintiff should be able to bring proceedings when there is a substantial deterioration in his condition, without running the risk that the limitation period will expire and he will consequently no longer have the possibility of bringing proceedings.

In conclusion, from the point of view of the ECHR, prescription must be applied with a certain degree of flexibility in cases of progressive illnesses in order to ensure a fair balance between the protection of the defendant's legal certainty and the plaintiff's right to effective access to justice, a balance which the rules of French law have respected by setting the starting point for the running of the limitation period at the moment when the medical condition is stabilized, i.e. when it loses its progressive nature, thus not being contrary to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.

[ ARTICLE 6 ]

Right to a fair trial

1. Everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, which shall decide either on the violation of his rights and obligations in a suit at law or on the merits of any criminal charge against him. Judgment shall be pronounced in public, but the press and public may be excluded from the courtroom for all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of minors or the protection of the privacy of the parties to the proceedings so require, or to the extent that the court considers absolutely necessary in special circumstances where publicity would undermine the interests of justice.

Article written by Mihai Stănescu - Managing Associate and Natanael Toma– Junior Lawyer.